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ABSTRACT
A high integrity can (HIC), designed to meet the ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code (Section III, Div.3, static conditions)
is proposed for the interim storage and repository disposal of
Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel.  The HIC will
be approximately 5 3/8 inches (134.38mm) in outside diameter
with 1/4 inch (6.35mm) thick walls, and have a removable lid
with a metallic seal that is capable of being welded shut.  The
opening of the can is approximately 4 3/8 inches (111.13mm).
The HIC is primarily designed to contain items in the DOE SNF
inventory that do not meet acceptance standards for direct
disposal in a geologic repository.  This includes fuel in the form
of particulate dusts, sectioned pieces of fuel, core rubble,
melted or degraded (non-intact) fuel elements, unclad uranium
alloys, metallurgical specimens, and chemically reactive fuel
components.  The HIC is intended to act as a substitute
cladding for the spent nuclear fuel, further isolate problematic
materials, provide a long-term corrosion barrier, and add an
extra internal pressure barrier to the waste package.  The HIC
will also delay potential fission product release and maintain
geometry control for extended periods of time.  For the entire
disposal package to be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, a HIC must effectively eliminate the disposal
problems associated with problem SNF including the release of
radioactive and/or reactive material and over pressurization of
the HIC due to chemical reactions within the can.  Two HICs
were analyzed to envelop a range of can lengths between 42
and 101 inches.  Using Abacus software,  the  HIC's were
analyzed for end, side, and corner drops. Hastelloy C-22 was
chosen based upon structural integrity, corrosion resistance,
and neutron absorption properties.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex there is
a need for a small diameter, high integrity dry spent fuel-
repackaging can (HIC).
Two groups within the DOE complex have an identified
need for the HIC and have been working toward its
development.  These groups are the DOE National Spent
Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) and the Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Spent
Nuclear Fuel (SNF) program.
The NSNFP desires a HIC to encapsulate damaged or
declad spent fuel for storage at the Monitored Geologic
Repository (MGR). The HIC will minimize the need for
characterization will be very corrosion resistant.
The HIC is needed by the INEEL SNF Program, which is
actively accepting repackaged spent fuel.  Fuel is received in a
variety of repackaging cans and put in interim dry storage at
the INEEL’s Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF).  The cans,
made primarily of stainless steel, are various sizes and
shapes, and have various lifting features and closure
mechanisms.
Each individual facility that ships spent fuel to the INEEL
must meet the INEEL fuel receipt criteria (Ref.1).  From this
criteria a variety of spent fuel repackaging cans have evolved,
each of which must be reviewed and approved by the INEEL.
This has resulting in a long review and approval process.
The HIC will help expedite this process for the INEEL
because it will be offered to all facilities as a “pre-approved”
INEEL can with a screw type closure lid.  The costs associated
with the review and approval of many different designs will be
avoided.
Eventually all spent fuel currently stored at the INEEL
IFSF will be moved to the MGR.  Spent fuel in the HIC will not
have to be repackaged prior to shipment, thus avoiding
repackaging costs.
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 Should the spent fuel in the HIC need to be inspected
before to shipment to the MGR, the screw top design of the
HIC allows it to be re-opened.   Prior to shipment to the MGR,
the HIC will be welded shut. The HIC will be fabricated from
Hastelloy C-22 and is expected to meet or exceed MGR
storage requirements.
SCOPE
This paper will discuss  the functions of the HIC, the
current design status, design features, upcoming challenges,
user responsibilities, cost estimates, and conclusions.
HIC FUNCTIONS
The HIC has several functions.  It will be used to
repackage dry spent fuel at various DOE sites.  It is not
considered an integral part of the transport package because
the transport package configuration is not known (and may
vary from shipment to shipment).  Transport packages must
protect the HIC, unless additional analyses are done which
qualify the HIC as part of the transport system.  The HIC will
also function as part of an interim storage container (in the
INEEL IFSF) and as an inner container (within a short, 18 inch
diameter DOE Standardized Canister, Ref. 1) for transport to
the Repository Surface Facility (RSF) located at the Monitored
Geologic Repository (MGR).
At the MGR, the HIC, contained within the Standardized
Canister, will be placed in the dry storage system.  At this
point, the HIC becomes a component of the dry storage
package within the MGR.  For long-term repository use, the
HIC will help maintain fuel in its configuration and provide
some neutron absorption to help mitigate a criticality (along
with spacing and loading) within the Standardized Canister.
The HIC will also perform as a long-term corrosion barrier at
the MGR due to the high corrosion resistance of Hastelloy
C-22.
At the IFSF or the RSF (within the DOE Standardized
Canister), the HIC must meet handling and potential drop
requirements.  The drop scenarios at other DOE facilities will
either be enveloped by the limits given in the HIC Design Input
Document (Ref. 2) or controlled to within limits of the design
input.
CURRENT STATUS OF DESIGN DOCUMENTS, REVIEWS,
AND TESTING
Completed Documents
Many documents have been completed in support of the
HIC design. Some of the documents are briefly discussed
below.
The Design-Input Document for the HIC (which is
essentially a design specification) has been written.  Many
DOE sites, including the MGR, and others have reviewed it.
The document has been approved by the DOE NSNFP.
Based on the Design-Input Document, extensive structural
analysis (Ref. 3) was performed using I-DEAS (for modeling)
and ABACUS (linear/non-linear analysis) software. Analytically,
the HIC met or exceeded all design input requirements.  A
large portion of the analysis consisted of drop calculations.
ASME Section III, Division 3, calculations were also
completed for the specified static load conditions.  As specified
in Design Input Document, the HIC meets the specified design
pressure of  250psi .
Criticality calculations (Ref. 4) were performed using
deflected shapes from the drop analyses.  The HIC was
determined to be critically safe alone or arranged in the
standard canister (U235 loading of 20.9 g/in or U239 loading of
11.8 g/in.) with 6 HIC’s nested in a standard canister around a
central empty can).
Software verification and validation reports were
completed to meet  DOE quality requirements (Ref.5).  These
reports were completed for ABACUS and I-DEAS, as well as
for the criticality software.
A HIC materials selection report specifying the use of
Hastelloy and a cost estimate were also completed as part of
the design package (Ref. 6 and 7).
A set of envelope drawings was produced to show the
overall design features of the HIC and an inspection/weld
review document is currently being completed.
Design Review and Testing Status
External design reviews and  an independent internal
review have been completed.  Comments resulting from these
reviews have been or are being incorporated.
The HIC is undergoing testing to assure that the
mechanical seal system performs as desired.  Preliminay tests
indicated that the metallic seals were not performing as
intended.  These seal problems are being  resolved (seal
surface polishing).
The remote operability of the HIC, using standard remote
manipulators, will also be checked. Thread galling of  Hastelloy
on Hastelloy is also a concern.  However, preliminary testing at
low torque values indicates that galling will not be a problem.
Additionally, drop testing mock-up HICs is anticipated to
be performed in the future to further validate analysis results.
HIC DESIGN FEATURES
The general HIC features are discussed below; followed
by a detailed discussion of specific features and desired
operational aspects.
General
The HIC will be constructed of Hastelloy C-22, has an
outside diameter of 5.375in. (136.5mm), within a minimum
inside diameter of 4.375in. (111.1mm).  The overall HIC
dimensions range from 42in. to 101in. (1.07 to 2.57m).  Inside
HIC dimensions are 36 to 95 inches (0.914 to 2.41 m).  These
dimensions encompass all spent DOE fuels anticipated to be
repackaged (See Fig. 1).
The HIC will have a removable screw-on lid.  The lid
allows for relatively easy inspection and/or repackaging at a
variety of facilities.  The lid has a mechanical seal for
confinement of spent nuclear fuel (to meet INEEL criteria,
Ref. 8).  The HIC can be opened, if needed, for later inspection
at the IFSF.  The HIC lid will be welded shut prior to shipment
to the MGR.  If the HIC spent fuel needs to be purged with an
inert gas, a “purge” lid will be added at the IFSF and welded
shut.
Specific Criteria
Lifting Fixture. The HIC’s lifting fixture meets the DOE
Hoisting and Rigging Standard (minimum factor of safety of 5:1
with respect to the materials’ ultimate tensile strength and 3:1
with respect to the materials’ yield tensile strength). It is
relatively short and designed to be engaged by a hook or lifting
tool.
Design Pressure. The pressure design meets the
requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
Section III, Division 3 (static loading conditions only).  The
Maximum (internal) Normal In-Plant handling Pressure (MNIP)
is 250 psig.  The Maximum Normal Operating Pressure
(MNOP) is 211 psig.  These pressure requirements allow the
HIC to be used for temporary management of SNF that is
essentially dry but containing some very small amounts of
water.
The HIC design also meets a maximum external
design pressure (occurring during the IFSF drying operation, if
needed) of 14.7 psig with zero internal pressure.  During this
process there will be a gradual increase in temperature from
ambient temperature to 572 o F.   Note that in actual use, the
HIC lid will be removed or loosened prior to drying.
Stacking and Storage Loads. The HIC design meets the
allowable stress requirements of ASME Section III for loads
encountered while the HICs are stored in a cask, in an IFSF
canister, or in a DOE Standardized Canister (within a  basket,
bucket, loading guide, etc).  A minimum stacking arrangement
(load) of 3 tiers of HICs was considered the basis for IFSF
storage.
Shipping Requirements. For this design effort, the HIC
was not considered part of the transport package.
Seismic Requirements. IFSF facility: The HIC meets
performance category PC-3 as defined by DOE STD 1020 and
the INEEL site-specific criteria (Ref. 10 and 11).  The HIC
maintains its geometry when subjected to an earthquake in the
IFSF storage facility.
Other facilities: Other facilities using the HIC for interim
storage must assure that the loads imposed from their seismic
criteria produce loads on the HIC which are equal to or less
than the loads imposed by PC-3 at the IFSF.  Alternatively, the
loads imposed on the HIC shall be recalculated and reviewed
to determine if acceptable.
Drop Analysis.  The HIC was analyzed and has
successfully passed the following criteria.  The selected
bounding drop scenarios are divided into three categories:
IFSF interim storage, Repository Surface Facility (RSF), and
Other Drops.  Each of these drop calculation categories was
performed with and without the 250 psig specified design
pressure.  Temperatures for the drops were between –20 0F to
100 0F.
• IFSF Drops  (HIC Lid screwed shut)
An individual HIC was successfully analyzed and has
passed the criteria for the worst vertical drop accident (top,
bottom, side, top edge, and bottom edge) from a
30ft.(9.14m) height.  Fuel confinement was ensured within
the HIC interior cavity by limiting crack width openings to
no greater than 0.05in (1.27mm).  Note that material
failure, which does not compromise fuel confinement, was
allowed.  Any material shown to reach the full ASTM
ultimate strain was considered to have failed.  Current
INEEL practice graphically connects (in a straight line) the
material strength from the ASTM value at 67% of ultimate
strain to zero material strength at 100% ultimate strain.
• RSF Drops (HIC Lid welded in place)
The HIC (placed six to a layer around a central “empty”
HIC in the DOE Standardized Canister), was successfully
analyzed and has passed the criteria for the case where
the DOE Standardized Canister is dropped horizontally
from a height of 30ft (9.14m). Fuel containment was
ensured within the HIC interior cavity by allowing no
material cracks. This calculation helps assure that the HIC
will survive a Standardized Canister drop with or without
the DOE Standardized Canister being in a cask.  See note
regarding  current INEEL analysis practice in previous
paragraph.  Note that deformed can shapes  were
considered by Criticality Safety personnel in their
analyses.
• Other Drops (HIC Lid Welded)
The HIC was successfully analyzed for other drops.
Dropping the HIC horizontally from 17ft (5.18m) onto a
blunt (1/2in or 12.7mm wide by 3in or 76.2mm tall) edge.
This simulates dropping a HIC onto an object such as a
brace holding up a DOE Standardized Canister.  Another
drop scenario considered was dropping the HIC (vertically)
onto another HIC from 30ft (9.14m).  Lastly, a case was
considered for dropping a HIC vertically 30ft (9.14m) to
determine if a ½ in (12.7mm) square object is able to
penetrate the base of the can.
Materials. The HIC will be constructed of Hastelloy C-22
(Ref. 6 & 9). Note that the HIC, although specified to meet
ASME Section III Division 3 criteria, uses material which is not
currently specified for this section of the ASME code (but is
expected to be approved).
Mechanical
HIC Lid. The HIC top is a removable screw–on design
with a mechanical c-ring type seal.  The seal is Hastelloy and
is coated with silver for a minimum of 50 years under interim
storage conditions including radiation, pressure and
temperature.  The HIC lid incorporates features that allow it to
be gripped, closed and sealed, and removed (and exchanged
with a helium purge lid) in the future at interim storage facilities
such as the IFSF.  The lid will be remotely welded shut prior to
shipment to the MGR.
The lid is flush with the HIC body outside diameter; inside
the HIC, the transition from the lid to the body is tapered to
facilitate loading and unloading contents.
HIC Envelope Testing. For normal (non-accident)
operations, the HIC envelope testing requirements are as
follows.  The HIC must withstand hydrostatic pressure testing
to 1.50 times the design pressure at standard temperature and
pressure (STP) and the HIC envelope must be tested to assure
a leak rate of no greater than 10-4 cm3/sec STP (external)
using helium at the design pressure.
General Process Requirements
The HIC user will specify their required length (between a
36in [0.914m] length and a 95in [2.14m] interior cavity length to
fit the “short” 18in (457mm) diameter DOE Standardized
Canister length), considering the lengths of the IFSF canister
and the DOE Standardized Canister.
For stacking purposes, when the HIC lengths are chosen,
the lengths shall be optimized for stacking in the DOE
Standardized Canister
Weight/Loading Considerations. The design of the HIC
considered the total weight of the DOE Standardized Canister
and contents limit of 5005 lb.  The design also considered the
weight limit of the IFSF canisters of 2000 lbs.
The HIC was designed for an internal contents weight of
4.7lb./inch (84g/mm), or roughly equivalent to a solid steel 4in
(101.6mm) diameter bar.  For example, a 36in (.914m) internal
length can has a capacity of approximately 170lbs (7.7kg).
Can Surface Finish. The surface finish for the HIC
material is the standard finish from the mill for Hastelloy C-22.
Marking Requirements. Each HIC will be marked with a
unique number specified by the NSNFP and shall be shown on
the fabrication drawings.
Corrosion and Design Life Requirements. Hastelloy C-
22 shows virtually no general corrosion or pitting of concern in
extended testing using expected repository water compositions
(Ref. 9).
The design life for interim storage is 50 years; the
design life for MGR storage is 300 years (Ref. 3).
Temperature, Humidity Conditions.  The analyses
considered conditions at the IFSF for interim storage and
canning.
At IFSF (Interim Storage) the environment is ambient
desert conditions in a dry storage environment, where
temperature and humidity extremes range from –20 to 1000F ,
and 10 to 100 percent relative humidity, respectively.
At the IFSF Canning Station, should the HIC contents
require drying in the IFSF Fuel Canning Station, the
mechanically sealed HIC lid will be removed or loosened.  The
maximum temperature (gradually applied) in the canning
station is 572°F (300° C).  A maximum change of temperature,
through the can wall thickness, of 100oF, for one drying cycle
was used for design/analysis purposes.
The HIC considered the design temperatures of the DOE
Standardized Canister.  The maximum design temperature of
the Standardized Canister is 350°F (in calm air) and 650°F
when inside another container (Ref. 2).
The maximum anticipated heat loading from the hottest
fuel is 4.25 watts/inch .
It is important to note that all temperature change cycles
were applied gradually.  No extreme or rapid temperature
changes are expected.  For thermal and stress analysis
purposes the following was used: 20 cycles with the design
pressure and a maximum change in temperature, through the
wall thickness, of 75oF.
Radiation.  For design purposes, the HIC considered
nominal radiation fields of 1500 R/hr (for the life of the HIC),
which is not a concern for Hastelloy.
CHALLENGES
Additional work will be performed to finalize the design.
Issues remain concerning remote welding and inspection,
remote operability, seal effectiveness, galling, drop testing, and
pressure testing.
Originally the Design Input Document specified that the
final closure weld (for the repository) would be remotely welded
with continuous visual inspection (with no volumetric
inspection). This was deemed necessary because of the
difficulties involved with radiographing welds with spent fuel in
a HIC.  However it is extremely unlikely that this would be
acceptable to the ASME. Ultrasonic inspection is being
developed at the INEEL as an option for inspecting final
closure welds.
Remote use and operability of the HIC was considered
during design.  These features will be tested prior to finalizing
the can design.
Further testing will be performed to test the metallic seal
effectiveness.  Currently the seal and/or sealing surfaces are
not providing the seal desired.
Testing to determine the torque necessary to seal the
pressure lid will be performed.  Friction and galling of the
Hastelloy will be addressed.  Preliminary testing indicates that
galling will not be a concern at lower torque values.
Actual drop testing of HIC’s is anticipated to be performed
to validate analyses.  HIC’s from 42 inches to 101 inches are
expected to be dropped.
Pressure testing of the vessels must be addressed.
Vessels that contain spent fuel and then are welded shut and
pressure tested pose a hazard should they fail.
Lastly, because the HIC will be an ASME pressure vessel,
and will be fabricated and stamped as such, there is a
challenge to address who will be responsible for, and who will
perform  the final closure weld.  The HIC may be in interim
storage for a number of years before this final weld is made.
HIC USER RESPONSIBILITIES
The HIC user must understand the design parameters of
the can and demonstrate that these parameters are met.  For
example, the maximum expected pressure generated from the
can contents must be shown to be less than the can pressure
limit.  The HIC user must also select the desired can length for
their fuel
COST ESTIMATES
Cost estimates (Ref.7) have been completed assuming
1000 HIC’s will be fabricated and are summarized below.
- ASME Code Certified, Hastelloy C-22 material: $5173 ea.
- Non-ASME Code Certified, Hastelloy C-22: $4793 ea.
- ASME Code Certified, 316L Stainless steel: $2298 ea.
- Non-ASME Code Certified, 316L Stainless Steel:
$2099 ea.
These estimates assume a die set for 5.38in (136.53mm)
diameter seamless tube is purchased by the NSNFP program
and used for all tubing fabrication.  Costs may be considerably
less for a rolled and welded plate product.
CONCLUSIONS
The HIC is expected to fulfill many functions.  It will act as
cladding for defective spent fuel, and will be physically very
strong and corrosion resistant.  It will be able to be
mechanically sealed for transport to interim storage.  The HIC
will be able to be opened (should the spent fuel need to be re-
inspected) prior to shipment to the MGR.  The HIC can be
welded shut and will withstand pressures up to 250psi.
Additionally, the HIC will be fabricated and certified as an
ASME pressure vessel.  The Hastelloy material and ASME
certification/fabrication will also assure that the HIC will be
suitable for long term repository storage, avoiding repackaging
costs.
The HIC is not part of the transport package unless a
shipper/cask owner decides to qualify the HIC for this function.
The extensive analyses performed to date will help such an
effort.
The HIC will meet the needs of the NSNFP, which is final
repository disposal, and the needs of the INEEL SNF program,
which are relatively easy can acceptance and interim storage.
The DOE at the INEEL is not an ASME stamp holder.  The
design documents generated (specifically the Design Input
Document, Analysis, Envelope Drawings) would serve as the
basis for direction to an ASME Design Owner.  The Design
Owner would cause the design to be developed, obtain a
Certificate of Compliance, and demonstrate the adequacy of
the containment system.  At some point in time, the DOE may
or may not become the Design Owner.  Again, the extensive
analyses and testing described herein is expected to
significantly help such an effort.
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